


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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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No. 0147/68  
4 May 1968

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*


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
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[ Vietnam: There are continuing indications that the Communists are preparing to step up the tempo of offensive military action.

The timing for any new offensive, however, is still highly conjectural. It is possible that the Communists' move to break the deadlock on talks with the US by proposing Paris as a site for discussions indicates they may mean to push political developments along to the point where they can be tied in more effectively with military activities in South Vietnam.

Hanoi may have feared that if the deadlock in starting talks persisted, it would tend to dissipate the full impact of any new military drive. With its military preparations now in an advanced stage in at least some areas, Hanoi may plan to kick off a new military push after the talks begin.

Reports from the Saigon area, however, indicate that enemy troops may be moving into forward assembly areas around the city. Several recently captured prisoners claim that a major assault on the city is scheduled in the next few days.

\* \* \* \*

Combat action eased somewhat on 3-4 May. Fighting in the coastal plains of Quang Tri Province began to taper off after three days of intense exchanges which took a heavy toll in enemy dead.

The battles in the area probably are of considerable significance for both sides. The losses suffered by the Communists could well delay any plans for a heavy new offensive directly against centers in the area such as Hue and Dong Ha. On the other hand, the scene of the battles close by ]

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[several of the major towns illustrates how markedly the Communists have expanded their operational areas along the northern coast.

Early this year, fighting in the region was still confined to the area directly south of the Demilitarized Zone.

\* \* \* \*

There is further evidence that the Communists are running substantial amounts of munitions into South Vietnam from southern Cambodia.

According to a Viet Cong defector [redacted]

[redacted] arms shipments including AK-47 assault rifles and 82-mm. mortars were being moved to Viet Cong units on a daily basis. The defector claimed the average day's shipment ran to some 4.5 tons. This appears excessively high, however, and probably beyond the needs of even an expanded Communist force in the delta.

Much of the information supplied by the defector nevertheless squares with that obtained earlier from another enemy cadre who worked at the same task in this area. It seems clear, therefore, that the enemy has a well organized and significant smuggling operation established in this region.

The source of the munitions is still uncertain. It is also possible that clandestine over-the-beach arms deliveries are being made in Cambodia near the South Vietnamese border, where smuggling controls are minimal. [redacted]

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\*Communist China: [Recent poster attacks involving top leaders add weight to other signs that the Chinese leadership is divided.]

[Key figures in both the "radical" and "moderate" factions are apparently under pressure. A huge poster reportedly displayed in Peking on 30 April indicates that Cultural Revolution group head Chen Po-ta is on the defensive. The poster contains both an "admission" of serious errors by Chen, and a statement defending him. On the other hand, Premier Chou En-lai issued a statement recently which had the effect of defending the foreign minister, Chen Yi, who once again seems to be under attack from militant Red Guards.]

[Chou and Chen Po-ta, who rank third and fourth in the hierarchy just below Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, have tended to be associated with "moderate" and "radical" viewpoints, respectively.]

[Conflicting guidelines presented by the joint May Day editorial in People's Daily, Liberation Army Journal, and Red Flag contrasted with the effort to provide a facade of unity at the May Day rally in Peking. The major stress was on the more militant themes which have appeared in domestic propaganda since the purge of several top military men in March. Factionalism, for example, was represented as a good thing, so long as proletarians are striking down the bourgeoisie. At the same time, however, important elements of the moderate line set last September were supported.]

*[\*The Director of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, do not consider that the Chinese leadership can reasonably be described as*

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"divided" on the basis of the recent poster and Red Guard newspaper materials cited by this article. They believe that the bulk of these materials received over several months indicate that both Chen Po-ta and Chou En-lai have worked in concert with Chiang Ch'ing and other leaders to bring revolutionaries under control, and that these materials do not show any of these leaders to be associated primarily either with "radical" or with "moderate" policies. They note that the defense of Chen Po-ta on the Peking poster cited in this item was by Hsieh Fu-chih, a reputed moderate. They do not believe it is clear what the regime was trying to say in its recent remarks about factionalism but, rather than indicating a divided top leadership, these remarks seem to reassert the position that the "revolutionary masses" are not to be pushed aside in the name of restoring order and that the line is to be held against those the regime considers to be ideologically unacceptable. They believe that the statement attributed to Chou En-lai cited in the item is, on the face of it, as easily interpreted as an attack on Chen Yi as a defense of him, and that while Chou's ultimate intention might have been to defend Chen, this is not established by any available evidence.]

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Czechoslovakia: Prague has let it be known that it will not support the recent East German efforts, backed by the USSR, to hinder access to West Berlin.

This is the first time since the new regime's "action program" was issued that the Czechoslovaks have taken a position on a topical policy issue at variance with their Communist allies.

According to the Czechoslovak news agency, the party's main daily, Rude Pravo, yesterday called on the four powers responsible for West Berlin to reaffirm their commitments to the city "distinctly, exactly, and sufficiently loudly." In an apparent reference to the East German bans on travel to West Berlin, the paper added that such a reaffirmation would exclude or greatly limit the "dangerous freedom in ideas as to what can and cannot be allowed" and would "help peace in Europe."


Rude Pravo pointed out that the controversy on Berlin access officially concerns the East Germans and West Germans, but added that it "basically" concerns the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Yesterday, however, the Soviet daily Pravda continued Moscow's expressions of support for the East Germans, describing the travel ban as "legitimate and necessary."

The Prague newspaper also implied, somewhat ambiguously, that Moscow might be trying to take advantage of US preoccupation in Vietnam to extract some sort of compensation in West Berlin. While it appears that the Czechs were merely trying to drive home the point that they are not interested in having a Berlin crisis, such an innuendo is certain to be resented by Moscow.

The Rude Pravo article, which generally reflects the views of the Czechoslovak leaders even

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if it was not necessarily cleared by them, doubtless will worsen already strained East German - Czechoslovak relations. Pankow claims that it alone controls civilian access to West Berlin, and will regard the article as interference in East German affairs.



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Liberia: President Tubman seems poised to crack down on elements he believes are working to undermine his regime.

Liberian security services reportedly have compiled a list of individuals to be purged, and the arrest or deportation of persons involved may begin next week. The purge could be fairly widespread, probably involving some prominent Liberian political figures, university students, and professors. It might also affect members of Liberia's foreign community, including some American college professors.

Tubman's expected move derives from the uneasy political situation in Liberia since the indictment of the former Liberian ambassador to Kenya last March on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government. Although the arrested ambassador, a member of a prominent tribal family, was in close contact with Chinese Communist agents and some radical pan-Africanists, a well-planned conspiracy almost certainly does not exist. The unrest among intellectuals is largely a shapeless, unorganized dissatisfaction with Liberia's sociopolitical structure, which still carefully guards the prerogatives of the Americo-Liberian coastal elite. Tubman and his security services are probably seeking an excuse to get rid of some political enemies.

Tubman may nevertheless be convinced that a wide conspiracy involving some tribal elements and reformist-minded Americo-Liberians is developing against his regime. He has in recent days emotionally attacked Liberia's "intellectual clique" for antigovernment "thinking" and has also accused resident foreigners, particularly Nigerian Ibos, of engaging in "underground activities."

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Chile: Military discontent over low pay has forced shifts in the cabinet and the army high command.

Reports that President Frei was secretly negotiating wage concessions to postal and telegraph workers and teachers, who have been on strike for more than a month, triggered the submission of resignations by a number of key middle grade military officers. Frei now has brought retired general Tulio Marambio into his cabinet as minister of defense, moving the civilian who had previously held the job to the Ministry of Economy. A military man has not served as defense minister for almost ten years.



MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
TULIO MARAMBIO

In a related development, army commander in chief General Miquelles, who had fought hard for military pay increases, resigned on grounds that he has seniority over Marambio. His replacement is General Sergio Castillo, a first cousin of the president of Frei's Christian Democratic Party.

Frei believes that granting increases to the military above those provided for in the wage adjustment bill now before congress would encourage other sectors to press for inflationary wage settlements. The appointments of Marambio and Castillo bring Frei supporters into two key positions. Marambio, however, is described by the US Embassy in Santiago as a bland, unimpressive personality of only moderate prestige in the army. In addition, the basic and increasingly acute problem of insufficient pay remains unresolved, and further expressions of military discontent can be expected.



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
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British Honduras: [Opposition is growing to the US mediator's proposed treaty to end the UK-Guatemalan dispute over British Honduras and grant it independence.]

[Last Monday the colony's opposition party rejected the treaty. A majority of the members of the ruling People's United Party in the national assembly are also opposed to it. They allege that the obligations for cooperation and consultation with Guatemala in the fields of defense, foreign affairs, and economics are incompatible with the sovereignty of an independent nation.]

[Disorders, including the stoning of the Guatemalan Consulate, followed the minority party's rejection of the treaty on Monday. Similar incidents may occur in the coming weeks.]

[British Honduran Premier Price will probably call for an independence conference even if the proposed treaty is not approved. The UK has indicated that it will be guided by local sentiment, but independence is not likely this year.]



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NOTES

Okinawa: The "Reversion Day" and associated rallies this week went off quietly despite the earlier fears of local authorities that they might be attended by widespread violence. Although demands were repeated for the removal of B-52 bombers and US bases, the only incident of any note was a small demonstration before the main gate of Kadena air base on 2 May.

Opposition speakers emphasized the defeat of the ruling Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party in elections next November, rather than violent agitation, as the best means of achieving early reversion to Japanese rule. Opposition chances have improved since the recent arrest of the deputy chief executive for bribery, an issue which has been used to try to force the chief executive's resignation.

Nigeria: Arrangements appear to be set for high-level federal and secessionist representatives to meet in London this weekend for preliminary talks under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat. This initial direct contact probably will focus mainly on the question of a site for further talks, although secretariat officials hope an agenda also will be discussed. Recent statements from the combatants suggest they are likely to haggle over the site issue. The progress of the federal thrust toward Port Harcourt may be making the Biafrans more eager, however, to proceed to substantive talks.

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
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
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


Zambia: President Kaunda told a large crowd on 1 May that the government has no intention of nationalizing the copper companies which dominate and support Zambia's economy. He implied that government policy is limited to ensuring greater investment by the companies to expand production. Kaunda spoke to head off possible misinterpretation of an interview he gave last week after the government had nationalized 25 foreign-owned "second tier" industrial and commercial companies and restricted the outflow from Zambia of copper company profits.



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[ Czechoslovakia-USSR: The high-level Czechoslovak delegation, which arrived in Moscow early today, probably will review with Soviet leaders current issues which have caused some friction between the two regimes. Despite recent signs that Prague will proceed somewhat independently of Moscow, party leader Dubcek and Premier Cernik in their talks will reaffirm Czechoslovakia's basic loyalty to the Soviet Union. The question of Soviet economic aid to Czechoslovakia may play an important part in the tour d'horizon. The inclusion of parliamentary leader Smrkovsky and Slovak party leader Bilak may be intended to underscore for Moscow's benefit that both the party and nation are united behind Dubcek's programs. ]

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